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Quantum Fingerprints that Keep Secrets
Dmitry Gavinsky∗ Tsuyoshi Ito†
Abstract
We introduce a new type of cryptographic primitive that we call hiding fingerprinting.
A (quantum) fingerprinting scheme translates a binary string of length n to d (qu)bits, typi-
cally d≪ n, such that given any string y and a fingerprint of x, one can decide with high accuracy
whether x = y. Classical fingerprinting schemes cannot hide information very well: a classical
fingerprint of x that guarantees error ≤ ε necessarily reveals Ω(log(1/ε)) bits about x. We call a
scheme hiding if it reveals o(log(1/ε)) bits; accordingly, no classical scheme is hiding.
For any constant c, we construct two kinds of hiding fingerprinting schemes, both mapping
x ∈ {0, 1}n to O(logn) qubits and guaranteeing one-sided error probability at most 1/nc. The
first kind uses pure states and leaks at most O(1) bits, and the second kind uses mixed states and
leaks at most 1/nc bits, where the “leakage” is bounded via accessible information. The schemes
are computationally efficient.
Our mixed-state scheme is optimal, as shown via a generic strategy that extracts 1/ poly(n)
bits from any fingerprint over O(logn) qubits.
Our results have a communication complexity interpretation. We give quantum protocols for
the equality problem in the models of one-way communication and simultaneous message passing
that have communication cost O(logn) and offer hiding guarantees that cannot be matched by
classical protocols of any cost.
Some of the technical lemmas in this work might be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
Cryptography probably is the area that benefits most from replacing classical computers by quantum
ones. In particular, the most restricting classical “axiom” of computational cryptography, the one it
owes its name to, can be partially removed: With quantum protocols it is no longer true that virtually
any interesting cryptographic protocol can be safe only if computational limitations of a potential
intruder are assumed.
The famous quantum key distribution protocol by Bennett and Brassard [BB84] is a good ex-
ample where the assumption that “an intruder is computationally limited” has been replaced by the
assumption that quantum mechanics is valid in our physical universe. And if we accept quantum me-
chanics, it is highly desirable to find more examples of quantum crypto-protocols with unconditional
security guarantees: Besides pleasing those of us who prefer to keep their secrets for themselves,
such examples might shed more light on the nature of differences between quantum and classical
information.
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Informally speaking, the possibility to use quantum mechanics in order to achieve unconditional
cryptographic security comes from the fact that, in general, quantum states are not “cloneable”
(cf. [WZ82]). Sometimes it can be very challenging to use this property alone (not making any com-
putational assumptions) in order to build a cryptographic primitive; moreover, some very tempting
goals are already known to be beyond the reach (cf. [May97]). It is the quest of quantum cryptography
to understand what crypto-goals can be achieved in a universe where the laws of quantum mechanics
are valid.
1.1 Fingerprints and their hiding properties
In this paper we will give a new example of a quantum crypto-primitive that is not achievable clas-
sically. We call it hiding fingerprints. Noticeably, hiding fingerprints are impossible classically even
modulo arbitrarily strong consistent assumptions.
In the context of this work the meaning of (classical) fingerprints is as follows. Given a binary
string x of length n, we want to (efficiently) produce its “partial description” by d bits, typically
with d ≪ n, such that given only the description of x and any y ∈ {0, 1}n, one can test whether
x = y with high accuracy. This can be achieved classically, for example by using a randomized
mapping x → (s, hs(x)), where hs is chosen at random from a 2-universal family of hash functions
(s identifies hs inside the family).
Quantum fingerprints have been introduced by Buhrman, Cleve, Watrous and de Wolf in [BCWdW01],
however they were not treated as cryptographic primitives. Generally speaking, an n bits to d qubits
quantum fingerprinting scheme is a mapping from n-bit binary strings to density matrices in 2d-
dimensional complex Hilbert space, such that when ρx is the fingerprint of x then given ρx and y, one
can decide with high confidence whether x = y. Obviously, quantum fingerprints are a generalization
of the classical ones.
Let E be a quantum fingerprinting scheme; we will be dealing with the following question. Given
ρx, how much classical information about x can be “extracted” from it? Formally, for any quantum
measurement P , how large can be the mutual information between a random variable X = x that
is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n and the outcome of P applied to ρx? The supremum of that
value is called the accessible information of E . In the special case when E is a classical scheme, its
accessible information equals the mutual information between X = x and a fingerprint of x that E
produces.
We will say that a fingerprinting scheme is hiding if its accessible information is o(log(1/ε)).
This is the “cryptographic ingredient” that we add to the otherwise known notion of fingerprints. No
classical fingerprinting scheme can be hiding, as we see next.
Let collision be the event when a fingerprint of x leads its holder to the conclusion that “x = y”,
even though the two strings are different. Denote by ε+ the maximum collision probability, taken over
all pairs x 6= y. Let ε− be the maximum, over all x ′s, probability that the fingerprint holder declares
“x 6= y”, even though y = x. Denote ε def= max {ε+, ε−}, this is the worst case error probability of
the fingerprinting scheme.
Let Ecla be a classical scheme that guarantees error at most ε. What happens when the holder
of a fingerprint of x loops through all 2n possible values of y and makes his best judgment whether
x = y? Let A contain those y ′s where the guess was “x = y”, then on the one hand, the expectation
of |A| is at most (2n − 1)ε+ + 1, and on the other hand, x ∈ A with probability at least 1 − ε−.
Therefore, at least (1 − ε−) log2(1/ε+) ∈ Ω(log(1/ε)) bits are leaked about x by its fingerprint in
Ecla (unless ε = 0, in which case n bits are leaked). Accordingly, Ecla is not hiding.
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The same reasoning does not apply to the case of quantum fingerprinting schemes, where a binary
string x ∈ {0, 1}n is mapped to a quantum state ρx, such that given any y ∈ {0, 1}n one can measure
ρx, in order to decide with high accuracy whether x = y. The argument fails because to make a guess
whether x = y one may be required to perform a quantum measurement, and such measurements
can, in general, change the state of a quantum fingerprint in an irreversible way. Alternatively, one
can say that the “looping trick” cannot be used because ρx is not necessarily cloneable.
From the practical point of view, hiding fingerprints shall be used when there is a need for a
“semi-trusted” agent to be able to perform string recognition, but not to share with others the ability
to recognize the target. Putting it differently, hiding fingerprints allow to issue an “authorization” to
perform certain pattern recognition limited number of times.
1.2 Our results
We construct new quantum fingerprinting schemes that hide information about x in a way that cannot
be achieved classically. For any constant c, we construct two different schemes, both mapping x ∈
{0, 1}n to O(log n) qubits and guaranteeing error probability at most 1/nc when x 6= y and no
error when x = y. The first scheme uses pure states and guarantees leaking of at most O(1) bits;
the second scheme uses mixed states and guarantees leaking of at most 1/nc bits. As follows from
the previous argument, these results introduce a new type of cryptographic primitives that cannot be
achieved classically.
Our schemes are computationally efficient. Constructions themselves are probabilistic: A de-
scription of a scheme includes polynomial number of random bits, and using uniformly chosen bits
results in a good construction with all but exponentially small probability. This random string can be
viewed as a part of the scheme’s definition, in particular it does not have to be kept in secret (e.g., it
may be standardized to define a globally used scheme).1
The “hiding guarantees” of our mixed-state schemes are optimal.2 To demonstrate that we con-
struct a generic strategy for extracting information from arbitrary quantum fingerprints. This “no-go”
result remains valid for several weaker notions of fingerprinting schemes than what we construct (e.g.,
for schemes with two-sided error; see Section 4 for more).
More formally, our main results are (cf. Theorems 3.13 and 4.5):
Theorem 1.1. For any constant c there exist quantum fingerprinting schemes that
• map n-bit strings to mixed states of O(log n) qubits and whose error probability and accessible
information are both bounded by 1/nc;
• map n-bit strings to pure states of O(log n) qubits, whose error probability is bounded by 1/nc
and accessible information is O(1).
The schemes are computationally efficient and have one-sided error with ε− = 0 (answers “x 6= y”
are always true).
Any quantum fingerprinting scheme that uses d qubits and guarantees error below 1/2 − Ω(1)
has accessible information 2−O(d).
1This is conceptually different from the role of randomness in any (nontrivial) classical fingerprinting scheme that
inevitably depends on the assumption that the input strings x and y are chosen independently from the random seed used
to build a fingerprint of x.
2Our optimality argument can probably be tuned to show that our pure-state construction is also optimal. We have not
pursued that direction, since the mixed-state schemes are a natural generalization of the pure-state ones, and therefore the
interest of showing optimality of a pure-state construction within its own class would be limited.
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To the best of our knowledge, hiding fingerprints cannot be obtained via classical reduction to
any previously known quantum cryptographic primitive.
Some of our technical contributions might be of independent interest.
1.2.1 Communication complexity perspective
The notion of quantum fingerprints has been introduced in [BCWdW01] mainly in the context of
communication complexity. The main conceptual contribution of the present work is to view quantum
fingerprints as a cryptographic primitive. Nevertheless, our results can be interpreted in the language
of communication complexity, as follows.
The most common communication complexity scenario is the one where two players, Alice and
Bob, receive two parts of input, x and y, respectively. The players communicate in order to compute
the value of certain function f(x, y), trying to minimize the amount of communication. Various
models exist that define the constraints that Alice and Bob have to obey when they compute f(x, y).
Relevant to us are the following two:
• One-way communication is a model where Alice sends a single message to Bob, who has to
give an answer based on that message and his input y.
• Simultaneous Message Passing (SMP) is a model involving a third participant, a referee. Here
both Alice and Bob send one message each to the referee, who has to give an answer based on
the received messages.3
In both the cases the players are computationally unlimited, and the cost of a communication protocol
equals the total number of sent bits. Quantum analogues of the models can be defined, where players
send qubits and locally perform arbitrary unitary transformations.
One of the most basic communication problems corresponds to the equality predicate, where the
goal of the players is to decide whether x = y. In general, fingerprinting schemes can be naturally
viewed as solutions to the equality problem, as follows.4
In the model of SMP, Alice and Bob both send the fingerprints of, respectively, x and y to the
referee. Then the referee performs the swap test that would always return “equal” if x = y and would
have positive constant probability of returning “not equal” if x 6= y. Thus, he can answer whether
x = y with one-sided constant error.
If such a protocol is based on our pure-state hiding fingerprinting scheme then its cost is O(log n).
It follows from the hiding guarantees of our schemes that this protocol is also hiding: an “eavesdrop-
per” can learn at most O(1) bits of information about the input (x, y).
On the other hand, as shown by Newman and Szegedy [NS96], the classical SMP-complexity
of checking equality with constant error probability is Ω(
√
n). Their argument readily implies that
any classical protocol leaks at least Ω(
√
n) bits about the input. Moreover, this holds for classical
protocols of any cost!
In the model of one-way communication, our mixed-state hiding fingerprinting scheme translates
trivially to a protocol of cost O(log n) that solves the equality problem with error at most 1/poly and
leaks at most 1/poly bits about the input. On the other hand, our classical impossibility argument
implies that any classical protocol that solves the equality problem with error ε necessarily leaks
Ω(log(1/ε)) bits about the input, and this is true for protocols of any cost.
3We consider the version of SMP without shared randomness.
4This was used in [BCWdW01] to demonstrate exponential separation between the quantum and the classical versions
of the SMP model.
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2 Preliminaries and more
Here we state only those technical lemmas that are relevant for the first part of the paper (construction
and analysis of the new fingerprinting schemes). Lemmas that will be used only in the second part of
the paper (showing optimality of our schemes) will be stated is Section 4.1.
We write exp(x) and sg(x) to denote ex and (−1)x, respectively. We write log to denote the
natural logarithm and log2 for the logarithm to the base 2. We denote i =
√−1 (to be distinguished
from the variable i).
We let N = {1, 2, . . . , } and [i] = {1, 2, . . . , i}. We often implicitly assume the natural corre-
spondence between the elements of [2n] and those of {0, 1}n. For any finite set A we let UA denote
the uniform probability distribution over the elements of A.
We use ◦ to denote concatenation of strings. For any set A and x ∈ An we will write xi to address
the i’th position of x; more generally, xi1,...,ik
def
= xi1 ◦· · ·◦xik for (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [n]k. For two strings
x and y of the same length, we will let dH(x, y)
def
= |{ixi 6= yi}| stand for the Hamming distance.
For D ∈ N, we write ID to denote the identity operator over CD. For a D × D matrix X,
we denote the trace norm of X by ‖X‖1 = tr
(√
X∗X
)
, and the operator norm of X by ‖X‖ =
max {|Xv||v| = 1}.
We will mostly use Dirac’s “bra-ket” notation for pure quantum states, but sometimes we will
find it convenient to switch to the standard notation (e.g., both v and |v〉 will be used to denote the
same unit vector in a Hilbert space). We will be addressing mixed states via their density matrices,
and denote by Den[D] the subset of CD×D corresponding to density matrices.
2.1 Random variables and their concentration
The Hoeffding bound will be one of our basic tools, we will use it in the following form (Theorem 2.5
in [McD98]):
Lemma 2.1. (Hoeffding bound) Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn be mutually independent,
satisfying E [X]i = µi and ai ≤ Xi ≤ bi for some constants ai and bi for all i. Then for any t > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∑Xi −∑µi∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
( −2t2∑
(bi − ai)2
)
.
The following lemma can be viewed as a generalization of the Hoeffding bound to the case of
random variables taking values in C.5
Lemma 2.2. Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn take values in C and be mutually independent,
satisfying E [X]i = 0 and |Xi| ≤ ci for some constants ci for all i. Then for any t > 0,
Pr
[∣∣∣∑Xi∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 4 exp
( −t2
4
∑ |ci|2
)
.
Proof. By the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 2.1), for any u > 0
Pr
[
ℜ
(∑
Xi
)
≥ u
]
, Pr
[
ℑ
(∑
Xi
)
≥ u
]
≤ 2 exp
( −u2
2
∑ |ci|2
)
.
5We view C as a vector space isometric to R2. For the general case of random variables taking values in an Euclidean
space there are known “dimension-independent” bounds. We do not use one of those, instead we state Lemma 2.2 whose
proof is “dimension-dependent” but the final expression is more convenient for our purposes.
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As |∑Xi| ≥ t implies that either ℜ(∑Xi) ≥√t2/2 or ℑ(∑Xi) ≥√t2/2, the result follows. 
The next statement will be very convenient for proving upper bounds on expected values of ran-
dom variables.
Lemma 2.3. Let f be a monotone non-decreasing function taking non-negative values, and let Y
and Y˜ be random variables satisfying Pr
[
Y˜ ≥ y
]
≥ Pr [Y ≥ y] for every y such that f(y) > 0. If
E
[
f(Y˜ )
]
<∞ then E
[
f(Y˜ )
]
≥ E [f(Y )].
Proof. Let Z def= f(Y ) and Z˜ def= f(Y˜ ). Then Z ≥ 0 and for every z ≥ 0 it holds that
Pr
[
Z˜ ≥ z
]
≥ Pr [Z ≥ z].
Therefore,
E [Z] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr [Z ≥ z]dz ≤
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
Z˜ ≥ z
]
dz = E
[
Z˜
]
,
as required. 
Our next goal is to prove yet another generalization of the Hoeffding bound. We will use a
modification of the standard method for proving such bounds, namely the “Bernstein’s trick”. The
next lemma is the main technical ingredient for that.
Lemma 2.4. Let Y be a random variable satisfying E [Y ] = 0, Y ≥ a and Pr [Y ≥ y] ≤ β exp(−α(y−
a)) for all y ≥ a and some constants a ≤ 0, β ≥ 1 and α > 0. Then for every h ∈ (0, α/2] and
c ∈ (0, 2],
E [exp(hY )] ≤ c+ exp


(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

 ≤ exp

c+
(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

 .
Proof. Denote by Eb the event that 〈Y ≤ b〉, were b ≥ a + log βα is a constant, and let Ib be the
Boolean indicator of Eb. Then
E [exp(hY )] = E [Ib · exp(hY )] +E [(1− Ib) · exp(hY )]. (1)
Let Y1 be a random variable distributed as Y modulo Eb. Then E [Ib · exp(hY )] ≤ E [exp(hY1)],
E [Y1] ≤ E [Y ] = 0, and a ≤ Y1 ≤ b. A standard result from the theory of concentration bounds
(e.g., see Lemma 2.6 in [McD98]) implies that
E [exp(hY1)] ≤ exp
(
(b− a)2
8
h2
)
.
Let Y2 be a random variable satisfying Pr [Y2 ≥ y] = β exp(−α(y − a)) for all y ≥ b. Then
Lemma 2.3 implies that
E [(1− Ib) · exp(hY )] ≤ E [(1− Ib) exp(hY2)] =
∫ ∞
b
exp(hy) · βα exp(−α(y − a)) dy
≤ βα
∫ ∞
b
exp((h− α)(y − a)) dy ≤ βα
∫ ∞
b
exp(−α
2
(y − a)) dy.
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From (1),
E [exp(hY )] ≤ exp
(
(b− a)2
8
h2
)
+ βα
∫ ∞
b
exp(−α
2
(y − a)) dy
= exp
(
(b− a)2
8
h2
)
+ 2β exp(−α
2
(b− a)).
This holds for every b ≥ a+ log βα , therefore
E [exp(hY )] ≤ min
{
exp
(
b′2
8
h2
)
+ 2β exp(−α
2
b′))
b′ ≥ log βα
}
.
Let c ∈ (0, 2] be any, and choose b′ = 2α log 2βc . Then 2β exp(−α2 b′) = c and
E [exp(hY )] ≤ exp
(
b′2
8
h2
)
+ c = exp


(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

+ c,
which is the first inequality stated in the lemma. Finally,
c+ exp


(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

 ≤ (1 + c) exp


(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

 ≤ exp

c+
(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

 ,
as log(1 + c) < c for c > 0. 
We are ready to prove a new concentration bound, that can be viewed as a “less demanding”
analogue of the Hoeffding bound.
Theorem 2.5. Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn be mutually independent, satisfying E [X]i = µ,
Xi ≥ a and Pr [Xi ≥ x] ≤ β exp(−α(x − a)) for all x ≥ a, i ∈ [n] and some constants a ≤ 0,
α > 0 and β ≥ 1. Let Sn def=
∑
Xi for i ∈ [n]. Then for every t ∈ (0, 17α ],
Pr
[
1
n
Sn ≥ µ+ t
]
≤ exp

− nt2α2
244
(
log βtα
)2

 .
Proof. By Lemma 2.4, for any h ∈ (0, α/2] and c ∈ (0, 2]
E [exp (h(Sn − nµ))] =
∏
E [exp (h(Xi − µ))] ≤ exp

nc+ n
(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2

 .
By Markov’s inequality,
Pr [Sn ≥ nµ+ nt] ≤ exp(−hnt)E [exp (h(Sn − nµ))] ≤ exp

nc+ n
(
log 2βc
)2
2α2
h2 − hnt

 .
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Let
c0
def
=
t2α2
122
(
log βtα
)2 and h0 def= tα2(
log 2βc0
)2 .
From tα ≤ 17 , it holds that 0 < c0 < 1 and 0 < h0 < α/2. Thus we may substitute h = h0 and
c = c0, still satisfying the requirements of Lemma 2.4. So,
Pr
[
1
n
Sn ≥ µ+ t
]
≤ exp

nc0 − nt2α2
2
(
log 2βc0
)2

 .
It can be seen6 that tα ≤ 17 and β ≥ 1 imply c0 < t2α2
/
4
(
log 2βc0
)2
, and therefore
Pr
[
1
n
Sn ≥ µ+ t
]
≤ exp
(
−nc0
2
)
= exp

− nt2α2
244
(
log βtα
)2

 ,
as required. 
2.2 ε-nets for pure states
In our proof we will need a “continuous analogue” of the union bound: Namely, for every D ∈ N
we want to have some sufficiently large T , such that if certain event E(v) holds with probability at
most δ for any fixed vector v ∈ CD, then with probability at least 1 − Tδ there is no v′ ∈ CD such
that E(v′) holds. Of course, in general that is not possible for infinite domains like CD; however,
the situation can be helped if there exists a “relaxed” version of E, that we denote by E′, such that if
E(v) holds and d(v,w) ≤ ε, where d(·, ·) is a measure of distance between vectors in CD and ε is
sufficiently small, then E′(w) must also hold.
Fix ε and let Wε = {w1, . . . , wT } be a finite set of vectors from CD, such that for every v ∈ CD
there exists some wi ∈ Wε satisfying d(v,wi) ≤ ε (such sets are commonly called ε-nets). Assume
that for any fixed v ∈ CD the probability that E′(v) holds is at most δ. Then, by the union bound, the
probability that E′(w) holds for some w ∈ Wε is at most Tδ. Now, if E(v) holds for some v ∈ CD,
then E′(w) holds for at least one w ∈ Wε, as the set contains an element at distance at most ε from
v. Therefore, the probability that E(v) holds for some v ∈ CD is at most Tδ.
The notion of distance between vectors can be formalized in many different ways, depending on
the nature of E and E′. The following definition serves our future goals.
Definition 1. For ε > 0, we call a set M ⊆ CD of unit vectors an ε-net for the set of pure states
in CD with respect to the trace distance, if for every unit vector |u〉 ∈ CD there exists |v〉 ∈M , such
that ‖|u〉〈u| − |v〉〈v|‖1 ≤ ε.
The following lemma is a slight improvement over Lemma II.4 of [HLSW04] and Lemma 4 of
[BHL+05], where the upper bound on the size of the ε-net was (5/ε)2D .
6Let x def= tα and f(x, β) def= c0
/
t2α2
4
(
log 2β
c0
)
2 , then modulo x ∈ (0, 17 ] and β ≥ 1 it is always true that
df
dβ
< 0. Let
f ′(x)
def
= f(x, 1), then df
′
dx
> 0 and therefore f(x, β) ≤ f( 1
7
, 1) < 1.
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Lemma 2.6. For every 0 < ε ≤ 2, there exists an ε-net for the set of pure states in CD with respect
to the trace distance whose size is at most (4/ε)2(D−1).
The proof of the lemma is given in the appendix.
3 New quantum fingerprinting schemes and their properties
We will use the standard way to construct a (pure-state) quantum fingerprinting scheme based on a
classical error-correcting code. Namely, given a code C from n to 2d bits, we will define, for every
a ∈ {0, 1}n, its fingerprint on d qubits via |ua〉 = 12d/2
∑
i∈[2d] sg(bi) |i〉, where b = (b1, . . . , b2d) =
C(a).
It would be very convenient for us to use a perfectly random code C; however we cannot afford
that as we want our construction to be computationally efficient. On the other hand, we can get an
efficient construction by using a random linear C , however it turns out that such code would not be
“random enough” for our needs (we need more randomness to guarantee that a scheme is hiding).7 So,
we define a new type of classical codes that still admit efficient encoding but contain more randomness
than random linear codes.
3.1 Random quasi-linear codes
In the following definition we use 2d to denote the codewords’ length in order to make the notation
more consistent throughout the paper.
Definition 2. Let r, n, d ∈ N, r < n < 2d. An (n, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C is represented by an
2d-tuple of (n − r)-bit vectors (c1, . . . , c2d) and a 2r-tuple of 2d-bit vectors (d1, . . . , d2r ). For every
a ∈ {0, 1}n we denote a(1) def= a|1,...,r, a(2) def= a|r+1,...,n, and define
C(a)
def
= da(1) ⊕
(〈
ci, a
(2)
〉)2d
i=1
,
where ⊕ denotes bit-wise xor.
In other words, (d1, . . . , d2r) is an arbitrary code applied to the first r bits of a and (c1, . . . , c2d)
defines a linear code that is applied to the last (n − r) bits; the actual encoding of a is the xor of the
two codewords.
For the rest of the paper we will write x(1) and x(2) to address, respectively, x|1,...,r and x|r+1,...,n,
when n, r and x ∈ {0, 1}n are clear from the context.
Obviously, C(a) can be computed efficiently when r ∈ O(log n) and d ∈ O(log(n)). We call a
quasi-linear code (uniformly) random if both (c1, . . . , c2d) and (d1, . . . , d2r) are selected uniformly at
random. We will denote this distribution by UC and write C ∼ UC to say that C is chosen uniformly
at random (the values of the parameters n, r and d will be clear from the context). Note that efficient
description of such code is possible as long as r ∈ O(log n) and d ∈ O(log(n)).
The following property of random quasi-linear codes can be viewed as a generalization of the
notion of minimal distance. Denote γC
def
= max
{∣∣dH (C(a1), C(a2))− 2d−1∣∣a1 6= a2}. Then
7Note that in the context of quantum fingerprinting there is no need to ever decode the underlying classical code, that is
why using a random linear code would be computationally feasible, despite the fact that no efficient decoding is known to
exist for such codes.
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Lemma 3.1. For every t > 0, PrC∼UC [γC ≥ t] < 2 exp
(
n+ r − 2t2
2d
)
.
Proof. Define AC def= {C(a1)⊕C(a2)
a1 6= a2}. Observe that AC = B1 ⊕ B2 ∪ B1 ∪B2, where
⊕ is element-wise, B1 = {da1 ⊕ da2
a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1}r ; a1 6= a2} and
B2 =
{
(〈ci, a1 ⊕ a2〉)n−ri=1
a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1}n−r ; a1 6= a2} = {(〈ci, a〉)n−ri=10 6= a ∈ {0, 1}n−r} .
Direct counting reveals that |AC | ≤ 2n+r .
It is easy to see that for every a1 6= a2 the string C(a1) ⊕ C(a2) is chosen uniformly at random
from {0, 1}2d when C ∼ UC . By the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 2.1), for every t > 0
Pr
C∼UC
[∣∣∣dH (C(a1), C(a2))− 2d−1∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(−2t2
2d
)
,
and the union bound implies the statement of the lemma. 
3.2 Pure-state scheme
For the rest of the paper we assume that d ∈ O(log n) and that r ∈ O(log n).
First, we define and analyze our fingerprinting scheme that uses pure states. Afterwords (Sec-
tion 3.3) we will consider a mixed-state scheme that can be viewed as a generalization.
Definition 3. LetC be an (n, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code, we denote by ECpure the following fingerprinting
scheme. Every a ∈ {0, 1}n is mapped to
|ua〉 = 1
2d/2
∑
i∈[2d]
sg(bi) |i〉 ,
where b = (b1, . . . , b2d) = C(a). We call |ua〉 the fingerprint of a.
Given |ua1〉 and any a2 ∈ {0, 1}n, in order to check whether a1 = a2 one should measure
|ua1〉 w.r.t. the projective measurement {Pa2 , I2d − Pa2}, where Pa2 = |ua2〉〈ua2 |. If the outcome
corresponds to Pa2 then “a1 = a2” shall be returned, otherwise the guess should be “a1 6= a2”.
Note that the transformation a → |ua〉 can be computed efficiently as long as C(a) is easy
to compute for every a, and that the required projective measurement can be performed efficiently
because d ∈ O(log(n)) and |ua2〉 is known.
Intuitively, the fingerprints corresponding to different pre-images should be nearly orthogonal.
This is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For {|ua〉
a ∈ {0, 1}n} defined over a randomly chosen (n, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code
C , for any δ > 0 it holds that max {|〈ua1 |ua2〉|
a1 6= a2} < δ with probability at least 1−2 exp(n+
r − δ22d−1).
Proof.
|〈ua1 |ua2〉| =
1
2d
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2d]
sg (b1i + b2i)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣2dH (b1, b2)2d − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2γC2d ,
where b1 = C(a1) and b2 = C(a2). By Lemma 3.1,
Pr
C∼UC
[
2γC
2d
≥ δ
]
< 2 exp
(
n+ r − δ22d−1
)
,
as required. 
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Now let us see that ECpure is likely to be a valid fingerprinting scheme.
Lemma 3.3. For ECpure defined over a randomly chosen (n, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C , it holds that
ε− = 0 always and that ε+ < δ with probability at least 1− 2 exp
(
n+ r − 2d−1δ), for any δ > 0.
Proof. Clearly, when a1 = a2 the answer is always correct, that is ε− = 0. When, on the other hand,
a1 6= a2 the probability of the wrong answer is |〈ua1 |ua2〉|2, and therefore by Lemma 3.2, ε+ < δ
with probability at least 1− 2 exp(n+ r − 2d−1δ), as required. 
Our next goal is to show that ECpure defined over a randomly chosen quasi-linear code C is hiding
with high probability. This will be done in stages.
Let us denote for every a ∈ {0, 1}n: ρa def= |ua〉〈ua|, ρ′a def= 2d−nρa, and for arbitrary v ∈ C2
d
,
µv(a)
def
= 〈v| ρ′a |v〉.
We will see later (Lemma 3.8) that for almost all choices of C we have ∑a ρ′a = I2d , and
therefore µv(a) is a probability distribution over a ∈ {0, 1}n for every fixed unit vector v. Intuitively,
this distribution corresponds to the “view about a” of a holder of ρa who has measured it and got the
outcome |v〉〈v|. Therefore, if originally a was chosen uniformly then some sort of distance between
µv and U{0,1}n should tell us how much has been learnt about a as a result of the measurement.
The following technical statement is the key part of our upper bound on the accessible information
for ECpure .
Lemma 3.4. Let v ∈ C2d be a unit vector and a0 ∈ {0, 1}n be fixed, and assume that ECpure is defined
over an (n, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C , then
E
C∼UC
[max {0, µv(a0) log (2nµv(a0))}] < 23
2n
.
In the view of the intuition expressed above, it shouldn’t be surprising that we want to prove this
kind of statement. Indeed, if µv is a probability distribution then
∑
a µv(a) log (2
nµv(a0)) is the
relative entropy between µv and U{0,1}n .
Proof. Let
ωav
def
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2d]
sg
(〈
a(2), ci
〉
⊕ da(1) i
)
vi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
then µv(a0) = ω
a0
v
2n and for every t ≥ 0,
Pr
C
[
µv(a0) ≥ t
2n
]
= Pr [ωa0v ≥ t] = Pr
β1,...,β2d∼U{−1,1}
[∣∣∣∑βivi∣∣∣ ≥ √t] ≤ 4 exp
(−t
4
)
, (2)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 2.2 and the fact that ‖v‖ = 1.
Define g(x) def= max {0, x log(x)} and let µ˜ be a random variable whose distribution satisfies
Pr [µ˜ ≥ t] = 4 exp(−t/4) def= f(t) for t ≥ 8 log 2. Then
E [max {0, µv(a0) log (2nµv(a0))}] ≤ 1
2n
E [g(2nµv(a0))] ≤ 1
2n
E [g(µ˜)],
where the first inequality follows from the definition of g(·) and the second one is by Lemma 2.3
(whose requirements are implied by (2) and g’s definition).
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Finally,
E [g(µ˜)] =
∫ ∞
8 log 2
x log(x)
(
− df
dx
)
dx =
∫ ∞
8 log 2
exp(log x+ log log x− x/4) dx < 23,
as required. 
At this point we suspend our analysis of ECpure and turn to a mixed-state scheme ECmix . Analysis
of ECpure will be resumed and merged with that of ECmix in Section 3.4.
3.3 Mixed-state scheme
To define our mixed-state scheme we introduce another parameter k ∈ N ∪ {0}, such that 2k is the
rank of every fingerprint (i.e., k = 0 corresponds to a pure-state scheme). It will always be assumed,
often implicitly, that d ≥ k and r ≥ k (the second assumption is probably less obvious, we need it
for technical reasons).
Definition 4. Let C be an (n + k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code, where d ≥ k and r ≥ k. We denote by
ECmix the following fingerprinting scheme. For every x ∈ {0, 1}n+k we let
|ux〉 = 1
2d/2
∑
i∈[2d]
sg(bi) |i〉 ,
where b = (b1, . . . , b2d) = C(x). Every a ∈ {0, 1}n is mapped to
ρa =
1
2k
∑
i∈{0,1}k
|ui◦a〉〈ui◦a| .
We call ρa the fingerprint of a.
Given ρa1 and any a2 ∈ {0, 1}n, in order to check whether a1 = a2 one should measure ρa1
w.r.t. the POVM measurement {Pa2 , I2d − Pa2}, where Pa2 is the projection to the subspace of R2d
that is spanned by
{
ui◦a2
i ∈ {0, 1}k}. If the outcome corresponds to Pa2 then “a1 = a2” shall be
returned, otherwise the guess should be “a1 6= a2”.
Note that when k = 0 the above definition gives ECpure , and the notions of |ua〉 and ρa coincide
with those considered in Section 3.2. To construct ρa, the holder of a tosses i ∼ U{0,1}k , produces
|ui◦a〉〈ui◦a| and then erases i. The measurement {Pa, I2d − Pa} can also be performed efficiently (as
any explicit measurement on O(log n) qubits), the simplest way to do so is to represent the measure-
ment as a projection in C2d+1 (recall that d ∈ O(log(n))) and perform that, using an auxiliary space
of dimension 2d.
To see that ECmix is a valid fingerprinting scheme with high probability, we will use Lemma 3.2
together with the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3.5. For 0 ≤ i < 2r , let M be any mapping from an i-tuple of unit vectors in R2d to a
unit vector in R2d . Then for any s ∈ {0, 1}n−r, δ > 0, and {|ua〉
a ∈ {0, 1}n} defined over a
randomly chosen (n, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C , it holds that
∣∣〈M(u0◦s, . . . , u(i−1)◦s)∣∣ui◦s〉∣∣ < δ
with probability at least 1− 2 exp(−δ22d−1).
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Proof. Note that by the construction of quasi-linear codes, |ui◦s〉 is a uniformly random element of{
2−d/2
∑
k βk |k〉
β1, . . . , β2d ∈ {−1, 1}}, even if conditioned upon v def= M(u0◦s, . . . , u(i−1)◦s).
So,
Pr
C
[∣∣〈M(u0◦s, . . . , u(i−1)◦s)∣∣ui◦s〉∣∣ < δ] = Pr
C


∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈[2d]
βkvk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 2d/2δ

 ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2d−1δ2),
where the inequality follows from the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 2.1) and the fact that ‖v‖ = 1. 
Let us see that ECmix is likely to be a valid fingerprinting scheme.
Lemma 3.6. For ECmix defined over a randomly chosen (n + k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C , it holds
that ε− = 0 with certainty and ε+ < δ with probability higher than 1−3 exp(n+r+k−δ22d−4k−7),
for any δ > 0.
Proof. Clearly, when a1 = a2 the answer is always correct, that is ε− = 0.
When, on the other hand, a1 6= a2, the probability of the wrong answer is tr(Pa2ρa1). Let
P ′a2
def
=
∑
i∈{0,1}k ui◦a2u
∗
i◦a2
; we will see that, with high probability over C ∼ UC , both tr(P ′a2ρa1)
and
∣∣tr((Pa2 − P ′a2)ρa1)∣∣ are small.
tr
(
P ′a2ρa1
)
=
∑
i∈{0,1}k
tr
(
ui◦a2u
∗
i◦a2ρa1
) ≤ 2kδ2C , (3)
where δC
def
= max
{∣∣u∗x1ux2∣∣x1 6= x2}.
Observe that Pa2 =
∑
i∈{0,1}k viv
∗
i , where vi
′s are “orthonormalized ui◦a2
′s”, as follows
v′0 = v0
def
= u0◦a2 ; v
′
i
def
= ui◦a2 −
∑
j<i
vjv
∗
jui◦a2 ; vi
def
= v′i/
∣∣v′i∣∣ .
Let ∆i
def
= vi − ui◦a2 , then
|∆i| ≤
∣∣ui◦a2 − v′i∣∣+ ∣∣vi − v′i∣∣ ≤ 2 i−1∑
j=0
∣∣v∗jui◦a2 ∣∣ ≤ 2kmax
j
{∣∣v∗jui◦a2 ∣∣},
and ∣∣tr((Pa2 − P ′a2)ρa1)∣∣ ≤ ∥∥Pa2 − P ′a2∥∥
≤
∑
i∈{0,1}k
∥∥(ui◦a2 +∆i)(u∗i◦a2 +∆∗i )− (ui◦a2u∗i◦a2)∥∥
≤ 3 · 2k max
i
{|∆i|} ≤ 3 · 22k max
0≤j<i<2k
{∣∣v∗jui◦a2 ∣∣}.
(4)
Now we apply Lemma 3.5, where M is the mapping that, according to our orthonormalization
process, maps (uk◦a2)
j
k=0 to vj . For fixed a2 and j < i, the lemma guarantees that 3 · 22k
∣∣∣v∗jui◦a2∣∣∣ is
less than δ/2 with probability at least 1− 2 exp(−δ22d−4k−3/9). By the union bound, the right-hand
side of (4) is less than δ/2 with probability at least 1 − 22k exp(−δ22d−4k−3/9) > 1 − exp(2k −
δ22d−4k−7). Another application of the union bound implies that the same holds for every a2 with
probability higher than 1− exp(n + 2k − δ22d−4k−7).
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By Lemma 3.2, it holds that the right-hand side of (3) is less than δ/2 (i.e., 2kδ2C < δ/2) with
probability at least 1− 2 exp(n+ r+ k− δ2d−k). Therefore, tr(Pa2ρa1) < δ for every a1 6= a2 with
probability higher than 1− 3 exp(n+ r + k − δ22d−4k−7), as required. 
Our next step is a statement analogous to Lemma 3.4 that would apply to ECmix . As before, we let
ρ′a = 2
d−nρa and µv(a) = 〈v| ρ′a |v〉 for arbitrary v ∈ C2
d
.
Lemma 3.7. Let v ∈ C2d be a unit vector and a0 ∈ {0, 1}n be fixed, and assume that ECmix is defined
over an (n+ k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C , where 2k ∈ ω(log n) and d ∈ O(log(n)). Then
E
C∼UC
[max {0, µv(a0) log (2nµv(a0))}] ∈ O
(
1
2n+k(
1
2
−λ)
)
for every λ > 0.
We will follow in the footsteps of our proof of Lemma 3.4, however we will have to use somewhat
“heavier” concentration tools.
Proof. For every j ∈ {0, 1}k, let
ωav(j)
def
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[2d]
sg
(〈
x(2), ci
〉
⊕ dx(1) i
)
vi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
where x = j ◦ a. Then µv(a0) = 12n+k
∑
j∈{0,1}k ω
a0
v (j).
For every j,
E
C∼UC
[ωa0v (j)] = E
β1,...,β2d∼U{−1,1}

∑
i,j
βiβjvivj

 = ‖v‖2 = 1
and E [µv(a0)] = 1/2n. Moreover, as we’ve seen in the proof of Lemma 3.4, from Lemma 2.2 and
from ‖v‖ = 1 it follows that that for every t ≥ 0, Pr [ωa0v (j) ≥ t] ≤ 4 exp(−t/4). Therefore, by
Theorem 2.5 it holds that
Pr
C
[
µv(a0) ≥ 1 + t
2n
]
≤ exp
(
−2kt2
3904
(
log 16t
)2
)
def
= f(t)
for 0 < t ≤ 4/7. Besides, it holds that 0 ≤ ωa0v (j) ≤ 2d.
As before, we define g(x) def= max {0, x log(x)} and let µ˜ be a new random variable that will re-
place µv(a0) in further analysis. We define the distribution of µ˜ by demanding that Pr [µ˜ ≥ 1 + t] =
f(t) for 0 < t ≤ 4/7 and Pr [µ˜ = 2d] = f(4/7). The requirements of Lemma 2.3 are satisfied by
g(·), µ and µ˜, and therefore
E [max {0, µv(a0) log (2nµv(a0))}] ≤ 1
2n
E [g(µ˜)].
By the definition,
E [g(µ˜)] =
∫ 4/7
0
(1 + x) log(1 + x)
(
− df
dx
)
dx+ 2dd · f(4/7).
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Clearly, f(4/7) ∈ exp (−Ω(2k)) and (1+x) log(1+x)(− dfdx) ≤ 2kx2f(x). For every λ > 0 there
exists Aλ > 0, such that f(x) ≤ exp
(−Aλ2kx2+λ) for 0 < x ≤ 4/7. So,
E [g(µ˜)] <
∫ ∞
0
2kx2 exp
(
−Aλ2kx2+λ
)
dx+ exp
(
d+ log d− Ω
(
2k
))
≤ 2
k
(2 + λ) (Aλ2k)
3
2+λ
· Γ
(
3
2 + λ
)
+ exp(d− Ω
(
2k
)
),
where Γ(a) def=
∫∞
0 x
a−1 exp(−x) dx is the Gamma-function. Therefore for 2k ∈ ω(log n) and every
λ > 0,
E [g(µ˜)] ≤ O
(
1
2k(
1
2
−λ)
)
,
as required. 
3.4 Further security analysis of ECpure and ECmix
Based on Lemmas 3.4 and 3.7, we continue our analysis of ECpure and ECmix . From this point on and
unless stated otherwise, we view the former as a special case of the latter, corresponding to k = 0.
First, as promised earlier, we prove that for almost all quasi-linear codes C , we have
∑
a ρ
′
a = I2d .
Lemma 3.8. If C is an (n + k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code such that the vectors c1, . . . , c2d are all
distinct, then
∑
a ρ
′
a = I2d . In particular, if an (n+k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C is chosen uniformly
at random, then
∑
a ρ
′
a = I2d with probability at least 1− 22d+r−n−k.
Proof. If c1, . . . , c2d are all distinct, then∑
a
ρ′a = 2
d−n−k
∑
x∈{0,1}n+k
|ux〉〈ux|
= 2−n−k
∑
x(1)
∑
i,j
sg ((dx(1))i ⊕ (dx(1))j)

∑
x(2)
sg〈ci ⊕ cj , x(2)〉

 |i〉〈j| = I2d ,
where x(1) ∈ {0, 1}r, x(2) ∈ {0, 1}n+k−r, and i, j ∈ [2d].
Now let C ∼ UC . For any fixed distinct i and j, ci equals cj with probability 2r−n−k. By the
union bound, the probability that all ci ′s are distinct is at least
1−
(
2d
2
)
· 2r−n−k < 22d+r−n−k,
as desired. 
Next we will argue that
∑
a∈{0,1}n µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) is unlikely to be large when C ∼ UC .
Lemma 3.9. Let v ∈ C2d be a unit vector and assume that C is a uniformly random (n + k, r, 2d)-
quasi-linear code, then for every δ > 0
Pr
C

 ∑
a∈{0,1}n
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) > αk + δ

 < exp
(
n− 2r−k−2d
(
δ
d
)2)
,
where α0 < 23, and αk ∈ O
(
1/2k(1/2−λ)
) for 2k ∈ ω(log n) and any λ > 0.
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Proof. We will use concentration bounds in conjunction with the mean guarantees of Lemmas 3.4
and 3.7.
Define new random variables
µ˜(a)
def
= max {0, µv(a) log (2nµv(a))},
then 0 ≤ µ˜(a) ≤ 2d−nd. From Lemmas 3.4 and 3.7 we know that EC [µ˜(a)] < 23/2n for k = 0 and
every λ > 0, and EC [µ˜(a)] ∈ O
(
1/2n+k(1/2−λ)
)
for 2k ∈ ω(log n).
We want to bound the probability that
∑
a µ˜(a) > δ. Let t
def
= r − k, assume w.l.g. that t > 0 and
define
Ai
def
=
{
j ◦ ij ∈ {0, 1}t}
for every i ∈ {0, 1}n−t. Observe that for every i0 ∈ {0, 1}n the random values
(
C(a)
)
a∈Ai0
are
distributed identically and independently when C ∼ UC , and the same is true for
(
µ˜(a)
)
a∈Ai0
.
Therefore the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 2.1) can be applied, resulting in
Pr
U

 ∑
a∈Ai0
µ˜(a) >
2nµ0 + δ
2n−t

 < 2 exp(−2t+1δ2
22dd2
)
,
where µ0
def
= EC [µ˜(a)]. Therefore, from the union bound:
Pr
U

 ∑
a∈{0,1}n
µ˜(a) > αk + δ

 < 2n−t+1 exp
(
−2r−k−2d
(
δ
d
)2)
,
as required. 
As we discussed before, if
∑
a∈{0,1}n µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) is small for a fixed v, that means that,
informally, a holder of ρa who has measured it and got the outcome |v〉〈v| has not learnt much about
a.
Our next step will be to argue that, with high probability,
∑
a∈{0,1}n µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) is small
for every pure state |v〉 ∈ C2d . According to the same intuition (which will be formalized soon), that
would imply that no outcome of a measurement of ρa exists, that can tell much about a.
First we argue that the function |v〉〈v| 7→ ∑a∈{0,1}n µv(a) log (2nµv(a)) has a good continuity
property (called the “almost Lipschitz continuity”) in order to discretize “every pure state |v〉 ∈ C2d”
in the above argument.
Lemma 3.10. Let C be an (n+ k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code, such that
∑
a ρ
′
a = I2d . Let 0 < ε ≤ 2/e
and |v〉 and |w〉 be unit vectors in C2d such that ‖|v〉〈v| − |w〉〈w|‖1 ≤ ε. Then,∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
µv(a) log(2
nµv(a))−
∑
a
µw(a) log(2
nµw(a))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2d−1ε log 2ε .
Proof. Fix any a and we will prove |µv(a) log(2n−dµv(a))−µw(a) log(2n−dµw(a))| ≤ 2d−n−1ε log(2/ε).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that µv(a) ≤ µw(a). Then,
µw(a)− µv(a) = 2d−n tr (ρa(|w〉〈w| − |v〉〈v|)) ≤ 2d−n−1 ‖|v〉〈v| − |w〉〈w|‖1 ≤ 2d−n−1ε.
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Therefore,
µw(a) log(2
n−dµw(a))− µv(a) log(2n−dµv(a))
= µw(a) log(2
n−dµw(a)) − µv(a) log(2n−dµw(a)) + µv(a) log(2n−dµw(a)) − µv(a) log(2n−dµv(a))
= (µw(a)− µv(a)) log(2n−dµw(a)) + µv(a) log
(
1 +
µw(a)− µv(a)
µv(a)
)
.
Note that (µw(a) − µv(a)) log(2n−dµw(a)) ≤ 0 and µv(a) log(1 + (µw(a) − µv(a))/µv(a)) ≥ 0.
Therefore,
|µv(a) log(2n−dµv(a))− µw(a) log(2n−dµw(a))|
=
∣∣∣∣(µw(a)− µv(a)) log(2n−dµw(a)) + µv(a) log
(
1 +
µw(a)− µv(a)
µv(a)
)∣∣∣∣
≤ max
{
−(µw(a)− µv(a)) log(2n−dµw(a)), µv(a) log
(
1 +
µw(a)− µv(a)
µv(a)
)}
≤ max
{
−(µw(a)− µv(a)) log(2n−d(µw(a)− µv(a))), µv(a) · µw(a)− µv(a)
µv(a)
}
≤ max
{
2d−n−1ε log
2
ε
, 2d−n−1ε
}
= 2d−n−1ε log
2
ε
.
By the triangle inequality, we have∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
µv(a) log(2
n−dµv(a))−
∑
a
µw(a) log(2
n−dµw(a))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2d−1ε log 2ε .
The left-hand side can be rewritten as∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
µv(a) log(2
n−dµv(a)) −
∑
a
µw(a) log(2
n−dµw(a))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
µv(a) log(2
nµv(a))−
∑
a
µw(a) log(2
nµw(a)) +
(∑
a
µv(a)−
∑
a
µw(a)
)
log 2−d
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
µv(a) log(2
nµv(a))−
∑
a
µw(a) log(2
nµw(a))
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which completes the proof. 
We are ready to see that with high probability,
∑
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) is small for every |v〉.
Lemma 3.11. Let C be a uniformly random (n + k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code. Let δ > 0 satisfy that
e3/2δ/4 ≤ 2d. Then,
Pr
C

∃ |v〉 : ∑
a∈{0,1}n
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) > αk + δ

 < exp
(
2d+1 log
22d+5
e2δ2
+ n− 2r−k−2d
(
δ
2d
)2)
,
where αk is as in Lemma 3.9.
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Proof. Let ε = 2−2d−3e2δ2. By the assumption, we have ε ≤ 2/e. Then we have
2d−1ε log
2
ε
=
eδ
2
· eδ
2d+2
log
2d+2
eδ
≤ eδ
2
· 1
e
=
δ
2
,
where the inequality follows from x log(1/x) ≤ 1/e. By Lemma 2.6, there exists an ε-net M for the
set of 2d-dimensional states with respect to the trace distance with size
|M | ≤
(
4
ε
)2d+1
=
(
22d+5
e2δ2
)2d+1
.
Suppose that the quasi-linear code C is such that there exists a unit vector v such that∑
a∈{0,1}n
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) > αk + δ.
Let w ∈M be a unit vector satisfying ‖|v〉〈v| − |w〉〈w|‖1 ≤ ε. By Lemma 3.10,
∑
a∈{0,1}n
µw(a) log(2
nµw(a)) ≥
∑
a∈{0,1}n
µv(a) log(2
nµv(a)) − 2d−1ε log 2
ε
> αk +
δ
2
.
This implies that
Pr
C

∃ |v〉 : ∑
a∈{0,1}n
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) > αk + δ


≤ Pr
C

∃ |w〉 ∈M : ∑
a∈{0,1}n
µw(a) log (2
nµw(a)) > αk +
δ
2

.
By Lemma 3.9 and union bound, the right-hand side is at most
|M | · exp
(
n− 2r−k−2d
(
δ
2d
)2)
≤ exp
(
2d+1 log
22d+5
e2δ2
+ n− 2r−k−2d
(
δ
2d
)2)
,
as required. 
It remains to be seen that small values of
∑
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) for all |v〉 ∈ C2d indeed imply
good hiding properties of the corresponding fingerprinting scheme.
Lemma 3.12. Let C be an (n + k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code such that c1, . . . , c2d are all distinct.
If a ∈ {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly at random, then the accessible information of the ensemble (ρa) is
at most
max
|v〉
∑
a∈{0,1}n
µv(a) log (2
nµv(a)) .
Proof. We follow a similar path to that used in a proof in Section 2.2 of Leung [Leu09]. Since
the accessible information can be always achieved by a rank-one POVM, let M = {αj |vj〉〈vj |}j
be a rank-one POVM achieving the accessible information, where |vj〉 is a pure state, αj > 0 and
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∑
j αj = 2
d
. If A is the random variable representing the choice of a and J is the random variable
representing the measurement result of the state under M , then
Iacc = H(J)−H(J | A)
= −
∑
j
αj 〈vj| I2d
2d
|vj〉 log(αj 〈vj| I2d
2d
|vj〉) + 1
2n
∑
a,j
αj 〈vj | ρa |vj〉 log(αj 〈vj | ρa |vj〉)
= −
∑
j
αj
2d
log
αj
2d
+
1
2n
∑
a,j
αj 〈vj| ρa |vj〉 logαj + 1
2n
∑
a,j
αj 〈vj | ρa |vj〉 log 〈vj | ρa |vj〉
= −
∑
j
αj
2d
log
αj
2d
+
∑
j
αj
2d
logαj +
1
2n
∑
a,j
αj 〈vj | ρa |vj〉 log 〈vj | ρa |vj〉
= d log 2 +
1
2n
∑
a,j
αj 〈vj| ρa |vj〉 log 〈vj| ρa |vj〉
= d log 2 +
1
2n
∑
a,j
αj2
n−d 〈vj | ρ′a |vj〉 log(2n−d 〈vj| ρ′a |vj〉)
=
∑
a,j
αj
2d
µvj (a) log(2
nµvj (a))
≤ max
|v〉
∑
a
µv(a) log(2
nµv(a)),
where the inequality follows from the convexity argument (the convex combination is at most the
maximum). 
Lemmas 3.3, 3.6, 3.8, 3.11 and 3.12 imply the following theorem:
Theorem 3.13. For any constant c there exist quantum fingerprinting schemes that
• map n-bit strings to mixed states over O(log n) qubits and whose error probability and acces-
sible information are both bounded by 1/nc;
• map n-bit strings to pure states over O(log n) qubits, whose error probability is bounded by
1/nc and accessible information is O(1).
The schemes are computationally efficient and have one-sided error with ε− = 0 (answers “x 6= y”
are always true).
Proof. Let k = ⌈4c lg n⌉, d = ⌈(18c + 1) lg n⌉ and r = ⌈(60c + 3) lg n⌉, and let ECmix be the mixed-
state fingerprinting scheme defined over a randomly chosen (n + k, r, 2d)-quasi-linear code C . By
Lemma 3.6, the probability that ε+ ≥ 1/nc vanishes as n→∞.
The probability that C violates the condition of Lemma 3.8 is negligible, so we assume the oppo-
site, that allows us to use Lemma 3.12. Applying Lemma 3.11 with δ = 1/(2nc) to Lemma 3.12 and
noting that αk ∈ O
(
1/2k/3
) ⊆ o(1/nc), we obtain that the accessible information is at most 1/nc.
Choosing k = 0 and adjusting d and r accordingly gives the desired result for ECpure . 
Note that only polynomial amount of randomness is required in order to describe any of our
fingerprinting schemes. Moreover, a random string may be published openly without compromising
the hiding guarantees of the schemes.
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Mixed-state schemes can be viewed as a natural generalization of pure-state ones. Our mixed-state
construction achieves much better hiding guarantees (in the following section we argue its optimality),
but even the pure-state one already reaches beyond the limitations of classical schemes, where we’ve
seen (cf. Section 1.1) that Ω(log(1/ε)) bits are leaked by any scheme with error at most ε.
4 Optimality of our schemes
In this part we construct a generic strategy for extracting information from arbitrary quantum finger-
prints. We give a strategy that retrieves at least 1/poly(D) bits of information about x from a (w.l.g.,
mixed-state) fingerprint of x over logD qubits.
We note that the following “no-go” argument remains valid for some weaker versions of finger-
printing than what is guaranteed by Theorem 3.13, namely:
• schemes with two-sided error;
• schemes that only work in average w.r.t. “balanced uniform” input distribution (i.e., (x, y) ∼
(UA + UB)/2, where A = {(x, x)} and B = {(x, y)
x 6= y}).
To extract classical information about unknown x ∼ U{0,1}n from its fingerprint ρ(x) ∈ CD×D,
we apply to ρ(x) a complete projective measurement
PV
def
= {|v〉〈v|v ∈ V } ,
where V is a uniformly chosen random orthonormal basis for CD.8 We will see that the mutual
information between the outcome of PV and x is at least 1/poly(D).
4.1 Technical preliminaries
Optimality of our scheme from Section 3 will follow from several technical lemmas that we state
next.
It is well known that the “distinguishability” of two arbitrary quantum states σ1 and σ2 is deter-
mined by their trace distance ‖σ1 − σ2‖1 . Informally speaking, we will show that a randomly chosen
complete projective measurement distinguishes between σ1 and σ2 only poly(D) times less efficiently
than a best distinguishing measurement.
Let UD1 denote the uniform distribution of unit vectors in CD. The following is a well-known fact
about UD1 .
Claim4.1. Sampling v ∼ UD1 can be realized via the following algorithm:
1 Independently sample u1r , . . . , uDr and u1i , . . . , uDi from the standard normal distribution N(0, 1).
2 Let v def= u/ ‖u‖ where u def=
(
ujr + u
j
i · i
)D
j=1
.
Proof. The density function of u is spherically symmetric. 
We need several technical lemmas. First, let us see that the length of the projection of a randomly
chosen vector v ∼ UD1 to any subspace cannot be “too concentrated”:
8The idea of using randomly chosen projective measurements in order to prove a lower bound on accessible information
has appeared in [JRW94]. However, our setting and the analysis are different.
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Lemma 4.2. LetA ⊂ [D], 1 ≤ |A| < D. Then for some η1 ∈ Ω
(
1
D2 logD
)
and η2 ∈ Ω
(
1
D2(logD)4
)
,
Pr
v∼UD1
[∑
i∈A
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ |A|
D
+ η1
]
≥ η2.
It is easy to see (by linearity of expectation and the fact that |v| = 1) that Ev
[∑
A
∣∣vi∣∣2] =
|A| /D, and therefore the above statement can be viewed as complementary to concentration bounds.
Proof. In the notation of Claim 4.1,
Pr
v∼UD1
[∑
i∈A
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ |A|
D
+ ε
]
= Pr

∑
i 6∈A
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≤ 1− |A|
D
− ε


= Pr
[∑
i∈A
∣∣vi∣∣2∑
i 6∈A |vi|2
≥ |A|+Dε
D − |A| −Dε
]
= Pr
[∑
i∈A((u
j
r)2 + (u
j
i )
2)∑
i 6∈A((u
j
r)2 + (u
j
i )
2)
≥ |A|+Dε
D − |A| −Dε
]
≥ Pr [Y + ≥ 2 |A|+ 2Dε] ·Pr [Y − ≤ 2D − 2 |A| − 2Dε],
(5)
where Y + def=
∑
i∈A((u
j
r)2 + (u
j
i )
2), Y −
def
=
∑
i 6∈A((u
j
r)2 + (u
j
i )
2), and the inequality follows from
Y + and Y − being mutually independent.
We analyze the behavior of Y + and Y −. Let “⊙” stand for either “+” or “−”. The distribution
of Y ⊙ is known as χ2k⊙ , where k
+ def= 2 |A| and k− def= 2D − 2 |A|; its density function is
ψ⊙(x) =
1
2k
⊙/2Γ(k⊙/2)
exp
(
−x
2
)
xk
⊙/2−1
(cf. [JKB94]). One can see that E [Y ⊙] = k⊙ and E
[
(Y ⊙)
2
]
= k⊙
2
+2k⊙ (thus, Var [Y ⊙] = 2k⊙).
For γ⊙ def= 5k⊙ log(k⊙) + 20, let Y ⊙
γ⊙
be distributed as Y ⊙ modulo Y ⊙ ≤ γ⊙. The density
function of Y ⊙
γ⊙
is
ψ⊙
γ⊙
(x) =
{
αγ⊙ψ(x) if x ≤ γ⊙
0 else
,
for αγ⊙
def
= 1/Pr [Y ⊙ ≤ γ⊙]. Then
k⊙ ≥ E
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
]
= αγ⊙
(
k⊙ −
∫ ∞
γ⊙
xψ⊙(x) dx
)
≥ k⊙ − ζ⊙
and
E
[(
Y ⊙
γ⊙
)2]
= αγ⊙
(
k⊙
2
+ 2k⊙ −
∫ ∞
γ⊙
x2ψ⊙(x) dx
)
≥ k⊙2 + 2k⊙ − ζ⊙,
where
ζ⊙
def
=
∫ ∞
γ
x2ψ⊙(x) dx ≤ 1
2k
⊙/2Γ(k⊙/2)
∫ ∞
γ⊙
exp
(
−x
4
)
dx (6)
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(the inequality follows from x2 · exp(−x/2)xk⊙/2−1 ≤ exp(−x/4), as guaranteed by our choice of
γ⊙). In particular, ζ⊙ < 1 and Var [Y ⊙γ ] ≥ 2k⊙ − ζ⊙ > k⊙ and
E
[∣∣∣∣Y ⊙γ⊙ −E [Y ⊙γ⊙]
∣∣∣∣
]
≥ Var
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
]
/γ⊙ > k⊙/γ⊙. (7)
Denote:
µ⊙
def
= E
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
]
∆⊙
def
= E
[∣∣∣Y ⊙γ⊙ − µ⊙
∣∣∣]
µ⊙+
def
= E
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
∣∣∣Y ⊙γ⊙ ≥ µ⊙] q⊙+ def= Pr [Y ⊙γ⊙ ≥ µ⊙]
µ⊙−
def
= E
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
∣∣∣Y ⊙γ⊙ < µ⊙] q⊙− def= Pr [Y ⊙γ⊙ < µ⊙]
Then
q⊙+µ
⊙
+ + q
⊙
−µ
⊙
− = µ
⊙,
q⊙+
(
µ⊙+ − µ⊙
)
+ q⊙−
(
µ⊙ − µ⊙−
)
= ∆⊙,
q⊙+ + q
⊙
− = 1,
which implies
q⊙+
(
µ⊙+ − µ⊙
)
= q⊙−
(
µ⊙ − µ⊙−
)
= ∆⊙/2. (8)
Clearly, 0 ≤ Y ⊙
γ⊙
≤ γ⊙ implies that
Pr
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
≥ µ⊙+ − β
]
>
q⊙+β
γ⊙
and Pr
[
Y ⊙
γ⊙
≤ µ⊙− + β
]
>
q⊙−β
γ⊙
for every β > 0. Choosing β = (µ++ − µ+)/2 gives
Pr
[
Y +
γ+
≥ (µ+ + µ++)/2] ≥ q++
(
µ++ − µ+
)
2γ+
=
∆+
4γ+
,
and similarly, via β = (µ− − µ−−)/2 one obtains
Pr
[
Y −
γ+
≤ (µ− + µ−−)/2] ≥ ∆−4γ− .
On the other hand, (8) implies that µ++ − µ+ ≥ ∆+/2 and µ− − µ−− ≥ ∆−/2. Therefore, from
(7):
Pr
[
Y +γ ≥ k+ − ζ+ +
k+
2γ+
]
≥ Pr
[
Y +
γ+
≥ µ+ +∆+/2
]
≥ ∆
+
4γ+
≥ k
+
4γ+2
,
and similarly,
Pr
[
Y −γ ≤ k− −
k−
2γ−
]
≥ k
−
4γ−2
.
From (6) it is obvious that ζ+ < 14γ+ , and therefore, by the definition of Y +γ+ ,
Pr
[
Y + ≥ 2 |A|+ 1
4γ+
]
≥ Pr
[
Y +
γ+
≥ k+ + 1
4γ+
]
≥ k
+
4γ+2
.
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By the definition of Y −γ− and the obvious fact that Pr [Y
− ≤ γ−] > 1/2,
Pr
[
Y − ≤ 2D − 2 |A| − 1
2γ−
]
≥ Pr [Y − ≤ γ−] ·Pr [Y −
γ−
≤ k− − k
−
2γ−
]
>
k−
8γ−2
.
Observe that k⊙
γ⊙2
≥ 1
51D(logD)2
and 1γ⊙ ≥ 111D logD for large enough D. Together with (5) this
implies
Pr
v∼UD1
[∑
i∈A
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ |A|
D
+
1
88D2 logD
]
≥ 1
83232 ·D2(logD)4 ,
as required. 
Denote by Ubas the uniform distribution of orthonormal bases of CD (i.e., the Haar measure). For
ρ ∈ Den[D], we will write PV∼Ubas(ρ) to denote the distribution of the outcome of PV (ρ) when
V ∼ Ubas. We will implicitly identify an outcome of PV∼Ubas(ρ) with the corresponding unit vector
in CD.
We need yet another “anti-concentration” statement, this time to say that the outcomes of PV∼Ubas(ρ)
cannot be too concentrated for any fixed ρ:
Lemma 4.3. Let B be a subset of unit vectors in CD, such that UD1 (B) ≥ ε. Then for any ρ ∈
Den[D],
Pr
v∼PV∼Ubas(ρ)
[v ∈ B] > ε
4
256
.
Intuitively, by choosing ρ adversarially one can selectively “hide” some unit vectors in CD from
PV∼Ubas(ρ). However, only those v
′s are hidden well that are almost orthogonal to all spectral com-
ponents of ρ, and that cannot happen to too many v ′s simultaneously; in particular, if B is sufficiently
large then it is impossible to efficiently avoid all its elements.
Proof. Observe that the distribution UD1 is the same as PV ∼Ubas(ID/D), and its density function is
constant on the support (unit vectors in CD) – denote it by φ0. Then by linearity, for any ρ the density
function of PV∼Ubas(ρ) is
φρ(v)
def
= φ0 ·D · 〈v|ρ|v〉 .
For δ def= ε3/64, let us bound from above the value of
Pr
v∼UD1
[φρ(v) < δ · φ0] = Pr
UD1
[〈v|ρ|v〉 < δ/D]. (9)
The expectation of 〈v|ρ|v〉 is 1/D, and therefore the value is maximized when ρ has rank one (if ρ
is a mixture that makes the value of 〈v|ρ|v〉 more concentrated). On the other hand, for every fixed
u0 and v ∼ UD1 , the distribution of |〈u0|v〉| only depends on |u0| (and not on the “direction” of u0).
Therefore, in order to bound (9), we can assume w.l.g. that ρ = |u0〉〈u0|, where u0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
That is,
Pr
v∼UD1
[φρ(v) < δ · φ0] ≤ Pr
UD1
[∣∣v1∣∣ <√δ/D],
where v1 is the first coordinate of v.
23
By Claim 4.1 we have:
Pr
v∼UD1
[∣∣v1∣∣ <√δ/D] = Pr [∣∣u1∣∣/‖u‖ <√δ/D] ≤ Pr [∣∣u1∣∣ < 2√δ/ε]+Pr [‖u‖2 > 4D
ε
]
.
We know that ‖u‖2 ∼ χ22D, and therefore its expectation is 2D and Pr
[
‖u‖2 > 4D/ε
]
< ε/2
by Markov inequality. We also know that ℜ(u1) ∼ N(0, 1), and therefore Pr
[∣∣u1∣∣ < 2√δ/ε] <
2
√
δ/ε = ε/4. We conclude that Prv∼UD1 [φρ(v) < δ · φ0] < 3ε/4.
Let B′ def= {v ∈ B
φρ(v) ≥ δ · φ0}, then it necessarily holds that UD1 (B′) > ε/4. By the defini-
tion of B′,
Pr
v∼PV∼Ubas (ρ)
[
v ∈ B′] ≥ δ · UD1 (B′) > δε4 = ε
4
256
,
and the result follows. 
The next lemma will be the core of our optimality argument.
Lemma 4.4. Let σ1, σ2, ρ ∈ Den[D], satisfying ‖σ1 − σ2‖1 = δ > 0. Then for some ξ ∈
Ω
(
δ
D3 logD
)
,
Pr
v∼PV∼Ubas(ρ)
[〈v|σ1|v〉 ≥ (1 + ξ) 〈v|σ2|v〉] ∈ Ω
(
(D logD)−20
)
.
Proof. To prove the statement, we will first consider the simpler case when v ∼ UD1 , then see what
happens when v ∼ PV∼Ubas(ρ).
Let σ′ def= σ1 − σ2, then
Pr
v∼UD1
[〈v|σ1|v〉 ≥ (1 + ξ) 〈v|σ2|v〉] = Pr
[〈
v
∣∣σ′∣∣v〉 ≥ ξ 〈v|σ2|v〉] ≥ Pr [〈v∣∣σ′∣∣v〉 ≥ ξ].
Let σ′ =
∑D
i=1 ei |ui〉〈ui| be a spectral decomposition, A+
def
= {iei > 0} and A− def= {iei < 0},
then for every ξ
Pr
v∼UD1
[〈
v
∣∣σ′∣∣v〉 ≥ ξ] = Pr
[∑
i
ei |〈ui|v〉|2 ≥ ξ
]
= Pr

∑
i∈A+
ei |〈ui|v〉|2 ≥ ξ +
∑
i∈A−
−ei |〈ui|v〉|2


≥ Pr

∑
i∈A+
ei |〈ui|v〉|2 ≥ ξ + E
v∼UD1

∑
i∈A+
ei |〈ui|v〉|2



,
(10)
where the inequality follows from
∑
ei = 0 and the fact that the random values
∑
A+ ei |〈ui|v〉|2 and∑
A− −ei |〈ui|v〉|2 are anti-correlated when v ∼ UD1 .
Observe that
∑ |ei| = δ, and so ∑A+ ei = δ/2. As Ev [|〈u|v〉|2] = 1/D for any unit vector u
and the right-hand side of (10) is symmetric w.r.t. any unitary rotation of the vectors {ui},
Pr
v∼UD1
[〈
v
∣∣σ′∣∣v〉 ≥ ξ] ≥ Pr

∑
i∈A+
ei ·
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ ξ + δ
2D

. (11)
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From Lemma 4.2, for some η1 ∈ Ω
(
1
D2 logD
)
and η2 ∈ Ω
(
1
D2(logD)4
)
Pr
v∼UD1

∑
i∈A+
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ |A+|
D
+ η1

 ≥ η2.
By the linearity of expectation,
E

∑
i∈A+
ei ·
∣∣vi∣∣2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈A+
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ |A+|
D
+ η1

 ≥ δ
2D
· |A
+|+ η1D
|A+| ≥
δ
2D
+
δη1
2D
.
Therefore, for some ξ ∈ Ω
(
δ
D3 logD
)
and η3 ∈ Ω
(
1
(D logD)5
)
,
Pr
v∼UD1

∑
i∈A+
ei ·
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ δ
2D
+ ξ

 = Pr
v∼UD1

∑
i∈A+
ei ·
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ δ
2D
+
δη1
4D


≥ Pr

∑
i∈A+
∣∣vi∣∣2 ≥ |A+|
D
+ η1

 · (δη1
4D
)/∑
A+
ei
≥ η1η2
2D
= η3.
From (11), Prv∼UD1 [〈v|σ
′|v〉 ≥ ξ] ≥ η3.
Applying Lemma 4.3 to the set
{
v ∈ CD〈v|σ′|v〉 ≥ ξ, ‖v‖ = 1}, we conclude that
Pr
v∼PV∼Ubas(ρ)
[〈
v
∣∣σ′∣∣v〉 ≥ ξ] ≥ (η3)4
256
∈ Ω
(
1
(D logD)20
)
,
and the result follows. 
4.2 Optimality statement
The following theorem concludes our optimality argument.
Theorem 4.5. Let Φ = {φ(x)
x ∈ {0, 1}n} ⊂ Den[D] be a quantum fingerprinting scheme that
guarantees error below 1/2− Ω(1). Then Φ leaks Ω(D−47) bits of information.
The theorem implies that any quantum fingerprinting scheme that leaks ℓ bits about x requires
Ω(log(1/ℓ)) qubits, and therefore our mixed-state construction of Section 3.3 (cf. Theorem 3.13) is
optimal. Note that while our constructions of fingerprinting schemes guarantee one-sided error, the
above theorem remains valid also for schemes with two-sided error. Moreover, Theorem 4.5 theorem
still holds for schemes that only work on average under the balanced uniform input distribution.
Proof. We will show that for any Φ, a measurement PV chosen at random w.r.t. V ∼ Ubas is likely
to have the following property: The outcome of P (φ(X)) has mutual information Ω(D−47) with the
random variable X ∼ U{0,1}n .
AssumeX = x0. Let ρ
def
= Ex∈{0,1}n [φ(x)]. Call a unit vector v ∈ CD x0-ε-good if 〈v|φ(x0)|v〉 ≥
(1 + ε) 〈v|ρ|v〉, where ε ≥ 0.
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The error guarantee of the theorem implies that ‖φ(x0)− ρ‖1 ∈ Ω(1) (as long as n > 0), and
therefore by Lemma 4.4,
Pr
v∼PV∼Ubas(ρ)
[v is x0-ξ-good] ∈ Ω
(
(D logD)−20
) (12)
for some ξ ∈ Ω(1/D3 logD).
For any unit vector v ∈ CD, let Av be the set of all x ′s, such that v is x-ξ-good. Let
p0
def
= Pr
X∼U{0,1}n
v∼PV∼Ubas (ρ)
[X ∈ Av] and p1 def= Pr
X∼U{0,1}n
v∼PV∼Ubas(φ(X))
[X ∈ Av].
By the definition of x0-ε-good we know that p1 ≥ (1 + ξ) · p0.
Note that p1 is the “actual” probability of certain event (namely, X ∈ Av), and p0 is what that
probability would have been if the outcome of PV∼Ubas(φ(X)) did not depend on X. Based on the
inequality between the two probabilities, we want to show that the outcome of the measurement is
well-correlated with the value of X. For that we use a lower bound on p0, as guaranteed by (12).
Now assume that the underlying distributions are X ∼ U{0,1}n and v ∼ PV∼Ubas(φ(X)).
H
[
X
∣∣v] ≤ −p1 · log2
(
2−n · p1
p0
)
− (1− p1) · log2
(
2−n · 1− p1
1− p0
)
,
as follows from the fact that the maximum entropy of a discrete distribution over a domain of given
size is attained when the distribution is uniform (so, in the right-hand side we consider the situation
when X is uniform both modulo “X ∈ Av” and modulo “X 6∈ Av”). Then
H
[
X
∣∣v] ≤ n− p1 log2
(
p1
p0
)
− (1− p1) log2
(
1− p1
1− p0
)
= n− dKL (D0||D1) ,
where Di is the distribution over {0, 1} that assigns weight pi to the outcome “0”. By the Pinsker’s
inequality,
dKL (D0||D1) ≥ ‖D0 −D1‖
2
1
2
= 2(p1 − p0)2 ≥ 2(ξp0)2 ∈ Ω
(
D−47
)
,
and therefore
H [X]−H
[
X
∣∣v] ∈ Ω(D−47).
Since v is the outcome of a measurement performed on a fingerprint of X, the result follows. 
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A Proof of Lemma 2.6
Let us repeat the lemma:
Lemma 2.6: For every 0 < ε ≤ 2, there exists an ε-net for the set of pure states in CD with respect to
the trace distance whose size is at most (4/ε)2(D−1).
To prove the lemma we use the following lemma that has been stated in [JRW94], where it was
attributed to [Sy´k74].
Lemma A.1. ([JRW94]) Let {|e1〉 , . . . , |eD〉} be an orthonormal basis of CD. Let |u〉 ∈ CD
be a random unit vector chosen according to the unitarily invariant probability distribution on the
unit sphere in CD. Let Xi = |〈ei|u〉|2 for i = 1, . . . ,D. Then, the range of the D-tuple ~X =
(X1, . . . ,XD) is equal to the probability simplex
∆D−1 =
{
(x1, . . . , xD) :
D∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0 (∀i)
}
,
and the probability distribution of ~X is uniform on ∆D−1.
Corollary A.2. Let |w〉 ∈ CD be a fixed unit vector. Choose a unit vector |u〉 ∈ CD randomly as in
Lemma A.1. Then Pr
[
|〈u|w〉|2 ≥ x
]
= (1− x)D−1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.6. The lemma can be proved by the packing argument in the same way as Lemma II.4
of [HLSW04] and Lemma 4 of [BHL+05]. The difference is that we apply the packing argument di-
rectly on the set of pure states by using Corollary A.2, instead of applying the packing argument on
the Euclidean space R2D as an intermediate step.
Let M be a maximal subset of {|v〉 ∈ CD : ‖v‖ = 1} such that every pair of distinct vec-
tors |u〉 , |v〉 ∈ M satisfy ‖|u〉〈u| − |v〉〈v|‖1 ≥ ε. By the maximality of M , M is an ε-net for the
set of pure states in CD with respect to the trace distance. For each |u〉 ∈ M , consider the open
ball Bε/2(|u〉) = {|w〉 ∈ CD : ‖w‖ = 1 ∧ ‖|u〉〈u| − |w〉〈w|‖1 < ε/2}. First fix |u〉 ∈ M . Then, if
we pick a unit vector |x〉 uniformly at random, we have
Pr
[|x〉 ∈ Bε/2(|u〉)] = Pr [‖|u〉〈u| − |x〉〈x|‖ < ε2
]
= Pr
[
|〈u|x〉|2 > 1−
(ε
4
)2]
=
(ε
4
)2(D−1)
,
by Corollary A.2. By the condition of M , the |M | open balls Bε/2(|u〉) (|u〉 ∈ M ) are disjoint.
Therefore,
1 ≥ Pr

x ∈ ⋃
|u〉∈M
Bε/2(|u〉)

 = ∑
|u〉∈M
Pr[|x〉 ∈ Bε/2(|u〉)] = |M |
(ε
4
)2(D−1)
,
which implies |M | ≤ (4/ε)2(D−1) . Lemma 2.6
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